The USSR’s Ill Fated Military Intervention in Afghanistan Essay

The USSR’s Ill Fated Military Intervention in Afghanistan In the Fall of1994 the Bulletin of the The Cold War International History Project mentions in an article, †Despite the declassification of numerous high-level Soviet documents the precise reasons behind the USSR’s massive, ill fated military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 remain murky†. Reading these documents it becomes obvious that intervention was the result of a long and sometimes bitter struggle within the politburo mostly in Chernenko’s handwriting. Six days earlier, the Politburo had approved sending a 500 man â€Å"Spetnaz†(military intelligence special unit) force to Afghanistan and now the Politburo subgroup of Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko, (Ponomarev was absent) together with Chernenko, obtained Breshshenev’s sighed consent to implement the agreed-upon measures leading to the deployment of 50-75,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan later that month, and using the (Spetnaz) force mentioned above to the killing of Amin and his replacement by Karmel as Afghan leader and head of PDPA,† The Soviet Documents do contain a number of complaints while failing to say, â€Å"this is the last straw, let’s invade.† One of the first of these is the Poliburo’s nervousness at the increasing conservative Islamic activity in the country coupled with activity in Iran whom they suspected of sending missionaries to Afghanistan dressed as natives. They also find the PDPA guilty of ‘draconian’ measures and miscalculations and mistakes.’ One of the first signs of major trouble on the horizon was a revolt in Herat in which many of the government troops joined with the rebels. Afghanistan (Taraki) asked for help to squash the situation but this help was denied. Seven months late... ...inister, and president of the Revolutionary Council, and secretary general of the PDPA. Opposition to Karmal and the Soviets, as you can see from Afghani history too much Afghani blood had been shed for its citizens to even consider a ruler from outside. By early 1980 the mujahideen had united inside Afghanistan and were resisting Soviet invaders or Soviet backed Afghani forces. In January 1987 a six month cease fire was declared by the Soviets. It was largely ignored by the Afghani. By 1986 the Afghani fighters had begun receiving shoulder fired ground-to-air missiles. These were capable of easily bringing down helicopter gunships and jet bombers. This is what brought the Soviets to the table. Peace accords largely in Afghani favor were signed in 1988. The last Soviet soldier left on Feb 15, 1989. The war, however, continued, now between the Afghani and themselves.